Malware
Macfinger ClickFix delivers architecture‑specific info‑stealer via shell‑script loader
A macOS 27.0 machine was infected by the Macfinger ClickFix campaign, which uses a shell script to download an architecture‑specific binary that steals credentials and persists in the user cache. The payload runs as com.apple.periodic and can survive reboots. Defenders should block the attacker IP, monitor the cache directory, and terminate any com.apple.periodic processes.
What happened
On 24 Sep 2026 a macOS 27.0 machine was infected by the Macfinger ClickFix campaign. The attacker delivered a shell script that downloaded an architecture‑specific Mach‑O binary and installed it under /Library/Caches/com.apple.securityd/com.apple.periodic.
Technical details
- Loader script is a shell script fetched from 45.131.215.56. It checks the host architecture with uname -m and pulls the matching binary.
- For Apple‑silicon hosts it downloads the arm64 binary from 45.131.215.56; for Intel hosts it pulls the x86_64 binary from the same IP.
- The binary is named com.apple.periodic and is executed as a background process. If a previous instance is running, the script terminates it before launching the new one.
- Once running, the payload collects credential data and other sensitive information, then exfiltrates it to the attacker’s command and control server.
Impact
Any macOS machine running the affected OS version can become a data‑stealing endpoint. The malware persists by residing in the user’s cache directory and can survive reboots until the binary is removed.
Mitigation
- Block outbound traffic to 45.131.215.56 and the hollow‑badger‑moasfraum.life domain.
- Monitor /Library/Caches/com.apple.securityd/ for new or modified files named com.apple.periodic.
- Terminate any running com.apple.periodic processes and delete the binary.
- Disable execution of unsigned shell scripts in user cache directories via Gatekeeper or MDM restrictions.
- Apply the latest macOS security updates and enforce least‑privilege execution policies.