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Threat Intel

Unauthorized HTTPS Certificates Issued for Google Domains via Hijacked .gh, .sl, .as Registries

Attackers compromised the .gh, .sl, and .as ccTLD registries, obtaining 12 unauthorized domain‑validated certificates for Google and YouTube domains. Google’s own systems were untouched, but the certificates could allow attackers to impersonate Google sites over TLS. Defenders should verify DNS integrity, monitor Certificate Transparency logs, and ensure revoked certificates are propagated via CRL sets.

What Happened

Between September 22 and 27, attackers altered authoritative DNS records for the .gh, .sl, and .as country‑code top‑level domains. This enabled them to request and receive 12 domain‑validated HTTPS certificates from Let’s Encrypt (11) and ZeroSSL (1) for Google and YouTube subdomains such as google.com.gh, google.sl, and google.as.

Impact

Any domain ending in .gh, .sl, or .as is now vulnerable to man‑in‑the‑middle attacks if an attacker presents one of the rogue certificates. Google’s own infrastructure was not compromised, but the certificates could be used to spoof Google services over encrypted connections.

Mitigation Steps

  • Verify that no unauthorized certificates exist for your domains in Certificate Transparency logs.
  • Ensure DNS records for your ccTLD domains are signed and monitored for tampering.
  • Coordinate with the issuing CAs to revoke any rogue certificates immediately.
  • Deploy CRL sets or OCSP stapling to block revoked certificates in browsers and applications.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Regularly query CT log services (e.g., ctlogs.dev, Cert Spotter) for new certificates matching your domain names.
  • Set up alerts for changes to authoritative DNS records at your registrar.
  • Review browser and server logs for unexpected TLS handshakes involving your domains.

certificate-hijack ccTLD Google DNS CRL CT logs Let's Encrypt ZeroSSL

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